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Abstract
Artin’s braid groups have been recently suggested as a new source for
public-key cryptography. In this paper we propose the first group signature
schemes based on the conjugacy problem, decomposition problem and root
problem in the braid groups which are believed to be hard problems.
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1 Introduction
Braid groups have recently attracted the attention of many cryptographers as an
alternative to number-theoretic public-key cryptography. The birthdate of braid
group based cryptography can be traced back to the pioneering work of Anshel et
al. in 1999 [2] and Ko et al. in 2000 [13]. Since then, braid groups have attracted
the attention of many cryptographers due to the fact that, they provide a rich
collection of hard problems like the conjugacy problem, braid decomposition problem
and root problem and there are efficient algorithms for parameter generation and
group operation [5].
Since the construction of a Diffie-Hellman type key agreement protocol and a
public key encryption scheme by Ko et al. in 2000 [13], there have been many
attempts to design other cryptographic protocols using braid groups. Positive results
in this direction are a construction of pseudorandom number generator by Lee et al.
in 2001 [15], key agreement protocols by Anshel et al. in 2001 [1], an implementation
of braid computations by Cha et al. in 2001 [5], digital signature schemes by Ko et
al. in 2002 [12], entity authentication schemes by Sibert et al. in 2002 [23] and a
provably-secure identification scheme by Kim et al. in 2004 [11].
Digital signatures bind signers to the contents of the document they sign. Group
signature schemes were introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [7] to allow individual
members of a group to sign messages on behalf of a group. Formally a group
signature scheme has the following properties [7]:
1. only members of the group can sign messages;
2. the receiver of the signature can verify that it is a valid signature of the group,
but cannot identify the signer;
3. in case of a dispute at a later stage, the signature can be opened to reveal the
identity of the signer.
The salient features of group signatures make them attractive for many specialized
applications, such as voting and bidding. More generally, group signatures can be
used to conceal organizational structures, e.g., when a company or a government
agency issues a signed statement. Group signatures can also be integrated with
an electronic cash system whereby several banks can securely distribute anonymous
and untraceable e-cash.
Group signatures are generalization of credential mechanisms ([6]) and of mem-
bership authentication schemes ( [17], [20]), in which a group member can convince
a verifier that he belongs to a certain group without revealing his identity.
In this paper, we design some group signature schemes using braid groups. These
are the first group signature schemes using braid groups.
In Section 2, we briefly review the basics of braid groups. We describe the initial
system set up and some security assumptions needed for building up these signature
schemes in Section 3. A group signature scheme whose security is based on the root
problem is described in Section 4. In Section 5, we describe a group signature scheme
that employ confirmation and denial protocols for identifying the actual signer. The
security of this scheme is based on the root problem, conjugacy problem and its
variants. A third group signature scheme whose security is based on the conjugacy
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problem and its variants is described in Section 6. The paper concludes with some
general remarks in Section 7.
2 An Overview of Braid Groups
In this section, we briefly describe the basics of braid groups, hard problems in
braid groups. A good introduction to braid groups is [3] and survey articles on
braid cryptography are [14], [8].
2.1 Geometric Interpretation of Braids
A braid group Bn is an infinite non-commutative group arising from geometric braids
composed of n-strands. A braid is obtained by laying down a number of parallel
strands and intertwining them so that they run in the same direction. The number of
strands is called the braid index. Braids have the following geometric interpretation:
an n-braid (where n ∈ N) is a set of disjoint n strands all of which are attached
to two horizontal bars at the top and bottom such that each strand always heads
downwards as one moves along the strand from top to bottom. Two braids are
equivalent if one can be deformed to the other continuously in the set of braids.
Let Bn be the set of all n-braids. Bn has a natural group structure. Each Bn is
an infinite torsion-free noncommutative group and its elements are called n-braids.
The multiplication ab of two braids a and b is the braid obtained by positioning a
on the top of b. The identity e is the braid consisting of n straight vertical strands
and the inverse of a is the reflection of a with respect to a horizontal line.
Let Sn be the symmetric group on n symbols. Given a braid α, the strands
define a map p(α) from the top set of endpoints to the bottom set of endpoints. In
this way we get a homomorphism p : Bn → Sn.
2.2 Presentations of Braid Groups
Any braid can be decomposed as a product of simple braids known as Artin gener-
ators σi, that have a single crossing between the i
th strand and the (i+ 1)th strand
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with the convention that the ith strand crosses under the (i + 1)th strand. The
homomorphism, p maps the generator σi to the transposition τi (= (i, i+ 1)).
For each integer n ≥ 2, the n-braid group Bn has the Artin presentation by
generators σ1, σ2, . . . , σn−1 with relations
σiσj = σjσi, where |i− j| ≥ 2, and
σiσi+1σi = σi+1σiσi+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2.
(2.2.1)
2.3 Some Special Classes of Braids
Let B+n denote the submonoid of Bn generated by {σ1, . . . , σn−1}. Elements of B
+
n
are called the positive braids. A positive braid is characterized by the fact that at
each crossing the string going from left to right undercrosses the string going from
right to left.
A positive braid is called non-repeating if any two of its strands cross at most
once. We denote D = Dn ⊂ B
+
n to be the set of all non-repeating braids. To each
pi ∈ Sn we can associate a unique α ∈ Dn in the following way : for i = 1, . . . , n
connect the upper i-th point to the lower pi(i)-th point by a straight line making
each crossing positive, i.e. the line between i and pi(i) is under the line between j
and pi(j) if i < j. The following lemma says that p restricted to Dn is a bijection.
Lemma 2.1. [9] The homomorphism p : Bn → Sn restricted to Dn is a bijection.
Hence non-repeating braids are also known as permutation braids. From this
lemma it follows that |Dn| = n!. In this way we can identify Dn with Sn .
Let LBn and RBn be two subgroups of Bn consisting of braids obtained by
braiding left ⌊n
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⌋ strands and right n− ⌊n
2
⌋ strands, respectively. That is,
LBn = 〈σ1, . . . , σ⌊n
2
⌋−1〉, and RBn = 〈σ⌊n
2
⌋+1, . . . , σn−1〉.
Then we have the commutativity property that for any α ∈ LBn and β ∈ RBn,
αβ = βα. These subgroups of Bn are used in designing various cryptographic
protocols.
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2.4 Canonical Decomposition of Braids
For two words v and w in Bn, we say that v ≤ w, if w = avb for some a, b ∈ B
+
n .
Then ≤ is a partial order in Bn [9].
The positive braid, ∆ = (σ1 . . . σn−1)(σ1 . . . σn−2) . . . (σ1σ2)σ1 is called the fun-
damental braid. A braid satisfying e ≤ A ≤ ∆ is called a canonical factor. There
is a bijection between the set of all permutation braids and the set of all canonical
factors [9]. Thus a canonical factor can be denoted by the corresponding permuta-
tion pi ∈ Sn. By pi∆, we mean the permutation corresponding to the fundamental
braid ∆.
For a positive braid P , we say that the decomposition P = A0P0 is left-weighted
if A0 is a canonical factor, P0 ≥ e and A0 has the maximal word length among all
such decompositions. A left-weighted decomposition P = A0P0 is unique [5]. A0 is
called the maximal head of P . Any braid x can be uniquely decomposed as
x = ∆uA1A2 . . . Ak, where u ∈ Z, Ai 6= e,∆, is a canonical factor (2.4.1)
and the decomposition AiAi+1 is left-weighted for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 [5]. This
unique decomposition is called the left canonical form of x and so it solves the word
problem. Since each canonical factor corresponds to a permutation braid, x can be
denoted as
x = piufpi1pi2 . . . pik, where pii 6= Identity, pif . (2.4.2)
Hence for implementation purposes the braid x can be represented as the tuple
(u, pi1, pi2, . . . , pik). The integer u, denoted by inf(x) is called the infimum of x and
the integer u + k, denoted by sup(x) is called the supremum of x. The canonical
length of x, denoted by len(x), is given by k = sup(x)− inf(x).
2.5 Hard Problems in Braid Groups
We use the following hard problems in our signature schemes.
1. Conjugacy Search Problem (CSP)
Let (x, y) ∈ Bn × Bn, such that y = a
−1xa, where a ∈ Bn or some subgroup
of Bn. The conjugacy search problem is to find a b such that y = b
−1xb.
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2. Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem (MSCSP)
Let (x1, a
−1x1a), . . . , (xr, a
−1xra) ∈ Bn×Bn for some a ∈ Bn or some subgroup
of Bn. The multiple simultaneous conjugacy problem is to find a b such that,
b−1x1b = a
−1x1a, . . . , b
−1xrb = a
−1xra.
3. Braid Decomposition Problem (BDP)
Let (x, y) ∈ Bn × Bn, where y = a1xa2 for some (a1, a2) ∈ LBn × LBn. The
braid decomposition problem is to find a pair (b1, b2) ∈ LBn × LBn such that
y = b1xb2.
4. Multiple Simultaneous Braid Decomposition Problem (MSBDP)
Let (x1, a1x1a2), . . . , (xr, a1xra2) ∈ Bn × Bn for some (a1, a2) ∈ LBn × LBn.
Themultiple simultaneous braid decomposition problem is to find a pair (b1, b2) ∈
LBn × LBn such that, b1x1b2 = a1x1a2, . . . , b1xrb2 = a1xra2.
5. Root Extraction Problem (RP)
Let x = ap, where a, x ∈ Bn and p ∈ N. Then the root problem (for the
exponent p) is to find a braid b ∈ Bn such that b
p = x.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, the initial system set up, intractability assumptions, some other
assumptions and some notation used in this paper are given.
3.1 Initial Setup
The system parameters n and l are chosen to be sufficiently large positive integers
and are made public. Since the braid group Bn is discrete and infinite, we cannot
have a uniform probability distribution on Bn. But there are finitely many positive
n-braids with l canonical factors, we may consider randomness for these braids.
Such a braid can be generated by concatenating l random canonical factors. Let,
Bn(l) = {b ∈ Bn | 0 ≤ inf(b) ≤ sup(b) ≤ l},
LBn(l) = {b ∈ LBn | 0 ≤ inf(b) ≤ sup(b) ≤ l} and
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RBn(l) = {b ∈ RBn | 0 ≤ inf(b) ≤ sup(b) ≤ l}.
Then |Bn(l)| ≤ l(n!)
l and so LBn(l), RBn(l) and Bn(l) are finite sets. We use the
random braid generator given in [5] (which produces random braids in O(ln) time)
for generating random braids. Also, we consider uniform probability distribution on
these sets.
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Bn(l) be a collision free hash function. H can be constructed
by composing a usual hash function of bit strings with a conversion from bit strings
of fixed length to elements of Bn(l). A way to construct this conversion function,
c : {0, 1}k → Bn(l) is given in [12].
3.2 Notations
We use the following notations through out this paper.
• By a ∈r A, we mean a random choice of an element a from the set A.
• By P
Q
−→ V , we mean P sends Q to V .
3.3 Group Manager
Let T be a group manager, who chooses the private key of the group and creates
the public key of the group. T also manages the members of the group. T is needed
in identifying the actual signer in our first and third signature schemes. T is not
needed in our second signature scheme.
3.4 Intractability Assumptions
We assume that the hard problems CSP, MSCSP, BDP, MSBDP, RP, stated in
Section 2.5 are intractable in braid groups. However, we assume that the conjugacy
decision problem given below is easy in braid groups.
Let (x, y) ∈ Bn × Bn. The conjugacy decision problem is to decide whether x
and y are conjugates or not, that is to decide whether there exists an a ∈ Bn such
that y = a−1xa or not. The conjugacy decision problem may be solved using the
algorithm given in [12].
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3.5 Some New Assumptions
In this paper, we make two assumptions. The first assumption is similar to the EDL
intractability assumption used in [16]. The EDL (Equality of Discrete Logarithms)
intractability assumption can be stated as follows : given x, y ∈r G = 〈f〉 = 〈g〉, it
is computationally infeasible to determine the equality of logf x and logg y over Zn,
where ord(g) = n. So we have our first assumption as
Assumption 3.1. For (α, β) ∈ Bn × Bn, let
Fβ(α) = {(a, b) ∈ Bn ×Bn : α = aβb}.
Then, given two pairs of braids (α, β) and (γ, δ) in Bn × Bn, it is computationally
infeasible to check whether Fβ(α) ∩ Fδ(γ) 6= ∅ or not.
The second assumption is about cardinalities of certain sets, which may be stated
as follows.
Assumption 3.2. Let n, l be sufficiently large positive integers, α, β, γ ∈r Bn(l),
a1, a2 ∈r LBn(l) and a ∈r RBn(l). Then the cardinality of the set
Ea(β, γ) = {b ∈ RBn(l) : b
−1αb = a−1αa, b−1βb 6= a−1βa}
is bounded below by a non decreasing function p(n, l) of n and l.
In this paper, we do not undertake any theoretical or numerical study to check
the validity of the above assumptions.
4 Group Signature Scheme 1
In [7] Chaum et al. describe a group signature scheme using public-key systems.
In this case the group manager T chooses a public key system, gives each person
a list of secret keys (these lists are all disjunct) and publishes the complete list of
corresponding public keys (in random order) in a Trusted Public Directory. Each
person can sign a message with a secret key from his list, and the recipient can verify
this signature with the corresponding public key from the public list. Each key will
be used only once, otherwise the signature created with that key gets linked. T
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knows all the list of secret keys, so that in case of a dispute, he can identify the
signer. Hence T is needed for the setup and for opening of the signature.
We can adopt this group signature scheme directly to the braid group frame work
as follows : T chooses a set E of braids and raises them to the pth power, where p
is an integer greater than 1. Each person is given a list of braids from E (these lists
are all disjunct) and the complete list of pth powers of elements of E (in random
order) is published in a Trusted Public Directory. To sign a message m, a group
member chooses a braid α from his list and forms the signature Sm = αH(m). The
recipient can verify this signature by computing (SmH(m)
−1)p and checking it with
the corresponding public key in the Trusted Public Directory. Each key will be used
only once. T knows all the list of secret keys, so that in case of a dispute, he can
identify the signer.
A problem with this scheme is that the group manager knows all the secret keys
of the group members and can therefore also create signatures. This problem can
be overcome by making each user to untraceably send one (or more) public keys to
a public list, which will be the public key of the group. But it has to be ensured
that only the group members will be able to send public keys to that list.
Although, the scheme is very elegant it has the obvious disadvantage that a
key can be used only once. However, we can trivially see that the security of this
scheme is equivalent to solving the root problem. Hence this group signature scheme
is highly secure. This is the only cryptographic scheme on braid groups whose
security depends solely on the root problem (RP).
5 Group Signature Scheme 2
In this section, we describe a group signature scheme which does not involve a group
manager. The security of the scheme is based on the hardness of BDP, MSCSP
and RP. Here the recipient of the signature can easily check whether the signature
has come from a particular group or not. But the identity of the signer can not be
verified unless the verifier engages in an interactive protocol with the signer as in
the case of undeniable signatures.
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5.1 Key Generation
Let G be a group with k members P1, P2, . . . , Pk. The members of the group agree
on a secret braid α ∈ Bn(l). β = α
4 is published as the public key of the group.
Also, each member Pi of the group chooses (ui, vi) ∈ LBn(l)× LBn(l) as his secret
key. In this case, the public key of Pi is xi = u
−1
i βvi.
We shall denote by PK the tuples (β, {xi}
k
1) generated as above.
5.2 Signature Generation
Let m be the message to be signed. Suppose Pi wants to sign m. He computes the
signature Sm = u
−1
i y
−1α2yui, where y = H(m).
We shall denote by SIG(m), the set of valid signatures on m.
5.3 Confirming the Group Identity of the Signature
Given an alleged signature Sˆm, suppose that a verifier V wants to check whether
it is a valid signature from the group G. V computes Sˆ2m and checks whether it is
conjugate to β using the algorithm described in [12].
Note that Sˆ2m = u
−1
i y
−1βyui. Hence if Sˆm is a valid signature of a member of G,
then S2m is conjugate to β.
5.4 Confirmation Protocol
Suppose that a signer Pi claims that a signature Sˆm was made by him. Then a
verifier V first checks the group identity of the signature using the above protocol
and then verifies the claim of Pi by engaging in an interactive confirmation protocol
with him. Let us denote the prover Pi by P . When Sˆm is a valid signature of m by
P , he will be able to convince V of this fact, while if the signature is invalid then no
prover even if he is computationally unbounded will be able to convince V to the
contrary except with a negligible probability.
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Signature Confirmation Protocol
Input : Prover: Secret keys (α, ui, vi).
Verifier: Public key (β, {xj}
k
j=1) and alleged Sˆm.
1. V chooses a ∈r RBn(l), computes Q = a
−1(Sˆm)
2xia and V
Q
→ P .
2. P chooses b, c ∈r Bn(l), computes R = buiQv
−1
i c and P
R
→ V .
3. V
a
→ P .
4. P Checks the value of Q and then P
(b,c)
→ V .
5. V verifies that R = ba−1y−1βyβac.
If equality holds then V accepts Sˆm as the signature on m, otherwise “undeter-
mined”.
Theorem 5.1. Confirmation Theorem. Let (β, {xi}
k
1) ∈ PK.
Completeness: Given Sm ∈ SIG(m), if P follows the signature confirmation pro-
tocol then V always accepts Sm as a valid signature.
Soundness: A Cheating prover P ∗ even computationally unbounded cannot con-
vince V to accept Sˆm /∈ SIG(m) with probability greater than
1
p(n,l)
.
Proof. Completeness: Let Sm be a valid signature. P computes
R = b(uiQv
−1
i )c = b(uia
−1(Sˆm)
2xiav
−1
i )c = ba
−1(y−1βyβ)ac.
which V verifies after getting (b, c) from P and accepts the signature as valid. Hence
the protocol is complete.
Soundness: The idea is that there are many values of a which give the same value
for the challenge Q and different values for the response R and a cheating prover
P ∗ has no way to distinguish between these different values of a, even if he has
infinite computational power. That is, from Assumption 3.2, there are at least
p(n, l) choices, for a ∈ RBn(l) which give the same value of Q but giving different
values of R. Hence it is infeasible for a cheating prover P ∗ to distinguish between
these different values of a, even if he has infinite computational power. Therefore a
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cheating prover P ∗, even computationally unbounded, cannot convince V to accept
Sˆm /∈ SIG(m) with probability greater than
1
p(n,l)
. Thus the protocol is sound.
Remark 5.1. A closer examination of the protocol reveals that it has the zero-
knowledgeness property also (see[26]).
5.5 Disavowal Protocol
If Pi wants to prove to V that Sˆm is not his signature onm, he engages in a disavowal
protocol with V . As in the case of confirmation protocol, we denote Pi by P . In
the case that Sˆm is not a valid signature, P will be able to convince V of this fact,
while if Sˆm is a valid signature of P on m, even if he is computationally unbounded
he will not be able to convince V that the signature is invalid except with negligible
probability.
Disavowal Protocol
Input : Prover : Secret keys (α, ui, vi).
Verifier : Public key (β, {xj}
k
1) ∈ PK, y and alleged Sˆm.
1. V chooses a, b ∈r RBn(l) such that a and b commute and computes
Q1 = a
−1(Sˆm)
2xia, Q2 = b
−1(Sˆm)
2xib and V
(Q1,Q2)
−→ P .
2. P computes the response R1 = uiQ1v
−1
i , R2 = uiQ2v
−1
i and P
(R1,R2)
−→ V .
3. V verifies that b−1(R1β
−1)b = a−1(R2β
−1)a.
If equality holds V accepts Sˆm as an invalid signature. Otherwise P is answering
improperly.
Theorem 5.2. Denial Theorem Let (β, {xi}
k
1) ∈ PK.
Completeness: Suppose that Sˆm /∈ SIG(m). If P and V follow the protocol, then
V always accepts that Sˆm is not a valid signature of m.
Soundness: Suppose that Sˆm ∈ SIG(m). Then a cheating prover, even computa-
tionally unbounded, cannot convince V to reject the signature with probability greater
than 1
p(n,l)
.
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Proof. Completeness: Assume that Sˆm /∈ SIG(m). We have,
R1 = uia
−1(Sˆm)
2xiav
−1
i = a
−1ui(Sˆm)
2u−1i βa and
R2 = uib
−1(Sˆm)
2xibv
−1
i = b
−1ui(Sˆm)
2u−1i βb.
Therefore,
b−1R1b = a
−1R2a = a
−1b−1(ui(Sˆm)
2u−1i β)ba.
Hence the protocol is complete.
Soundness: Assume that Sˆm ∈ SIG(m). Let R1 and R2 be the responses given by
P ∗ in the protocol. Let if possible, b−1R1b = a
−1R2a. Then
R2 = a(b
−1R1b)a
−1 = aβa−1, where γ = b−1R1b.
In the worst case, we may regard γ as a known constant for P when he tries to
determine R2. But then the ability to determine R2 amounts to the establishment of
an invalid signature, which contradicts Theorem 5.1 (soundness of the confirmation
protocol). Hence the protocol is sound.
Remark 5.2. For the ease of analysis, the disavowal protocol was given in a non
zero-knowledge fashion. However, zero-knowledge versions of the disavowal protocol
can also be constructed in a similar manner (see [26]).
6 Group Signature Scheme 3
In this section, we describe another group signature scheme. This scheme is given
in the usual frame work of group signature schemes as described in [19]. The secu-
rity of the scheme is based on the hardnes of CSP, MSCSP and MSBDP. Here
the recipient of the signature can easily verify the group identity of the signature.
However, if a dispute occurs the group manager can open the signature and identify
the signer.
6.1 Setup
The group manager T chooses a secret braid s ∈r LBn(l), k1, k2 ∈r RBn(l), and
α ∈r Bn(l) and publishes x = s
−1αs as the public key of the group.
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6.2 Join
Suppose now that a user P wants to join the group. We assume that the communi-
cation between a group member and T is secure, that is private and authentic.
The following protocol is performed between the user P and the Trusted Au-
thority T .
1. T
(s,α)
−→ P .
2. P chooses u ∈r Bn(l) , a ∈r LBn(l) computes v = u
−1αu, w = a−1ua and
P
(v,w)
−→ T .
3. T computes z1 = k
−1
1 wk1, z2 = k
−1
2 wk2 and T
(z1,z2)
−→ P .
4. P computes β1 = az1a
−1 and β2 = az2a
−1.
Consequently, at the end of the protocol, T creates a new entry in the group database
with v as the public key of the member P .
6.3 Sign
Let m be the message which has to be signed. Suppose that the group member P
wants to sign m. He computes S1 = s
−1ys and S2 = s
−1β−11 yβ2s, where y = H(m).
Signature is the pair Sm = (S1, S2).
6.4 Verify
A recipient of the signature after getting Sm, checks whether S1 is conjugate to y to
check whether Sm is a valid signature of y or not.
To check the group identity of the signature, V checks whether S1x is conjugate
to yα. If it holds, V accepts Sm as a signature from the group G.
6.5 Open
In case of a dispute, the group manager can identify the signer of the signature
Sˆm = (Sˆ1, Sˆ2) in the following way. He first computes Sˆ3 = k1sSˆ2s
−1k−12 . Now
he can find out whether P is the signer by checking whether Sˆ3v is conjugate to
k1yk
−1
2 α or not. If it holds, the signature was made by P .
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6.6 Security Analysis
In this section we will show that this group signature scheme satisfies some of the
properties of for an ideal group signature.
1. Unforgeability: Since to sign on behalf of the group, one should know the
secret key s, only group members can sign on behalf of the group. However,
an attacker gets several pairs of braids and its conjugates by s. Hence under
the assumption that multiple simultaneous conjugacy decomposition problem
(MSCDP) is hard in braid groups an attacker cannot get s and the signature
scheme stands unforgeable.
Remark 6.1. We may make our scheme more secure by avoiding an attack
on MSCDP in the following way : the group manager chooses s1, s2 ∈r LBn(l)
instead of s ∈r LBn(l). He makes the group public key as s
−1
2 αs1. Now,
given a message m the signer computes the signature as Sm = (S1 = s
−1
1 ys2,
S2 = s1β
−1
1 yβ2s2). The protocols for verification and opening the signature
can be rewritten in a similar way.
2. Unlinkability: Letm1 andm2 be two messages signed by the group members.
Let y1 = H(m1) and y2 = H(m2). Let Sm1 = (S
1
1 , S
1
2) and Sm2 = (S
2
1 , S
2
2).
Now, the problem of linking Sm1 and Sm2 reduces to deciding whether S
1
2 and
S22 are linked or not. Now, S
1
2 = s
−1β−11 y1β2s and S
2
2 = s
−1β−11 y2β2s. Hence
deciding whether S12 and S
2
2 are linked or not reduces to checking whether the
pairs (S12 , y1) and (S
2
2 , y2) have the same factors or not. Now, this is infeasible
by Assumption 3.1. Hence the signature scheme is unlinkable.
3. Anonymity: Given a group signature, to identify the actual signer is compu-
tationally hard to do for everyone but the group manager. Consider a signature
on m by P . Let Sm = (S1, S2). Now S2 = s
−1(k−11 u
−1k1)y(k
−1
2 uk2)s and in
order to show that the signature belongs to P , a group member has to prove
that (k1sSˆ2s
−1k−12 )v is conjugate to k1yk
−1
2 α. There is no apparent way of
proving the identity of the signer other than by getting the private keys of the
signer or that of the Trusted Authority. But any group member can compute
15
sS2s
−1 = (k−11 u
−1k1)y(k
−1
2 uk2). Now, the only way for a group member Pˆ with
secret key vˆ to find out the identity of the signer is to get the value of k1 and
k2 from k
−1
1 vˆk1 and k
−1
2 vˆk2 which he obtained from the group manger. But
this amounts to solving a conjugacy search problem and by assumption the
conjugacy search problem is hard. Hence the signature scheme is anonymous.
4. Exculpability : The group manager does not get any information about
a group member’s secret key u as well as signing keys k−11 uk1 and k
−1
2 uk2.
The values of u as well k−11 uk1 and k
−1
2 uk2 are computationally hidden from
the group manager because of the protocols involved in the Join session of
the member P . Hence the group manager cannot sign on behalf of a group
member. Similarly, any group member cannot sign on behalf of any other
member. Hence exculpability holds.
5. Traceability: Assume that the signature Sm = (S1, S2) on the message m
was made by P . Now the group manager can compute
S3v = (k1sS2s
−1k−12 )v = (k1s(s
−1β−11 yβ2s)s
−1k−12 )(u
−1αu)
= (k1β
−1
1 yβ2k
−1
2 )(u
−1αu) = (k1(k
−1
1 u
−1k1)y(k
−1
2 uk2)k
−1
2 )(u
−1αu)
= u−1k1yk
−1
2 αu.
Hence S3v is conjugate to k1yk
−1
2 α. Thus, the group manager can open any
valid group signature and identify the actual signer. Hence the signature is
traceable.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we constructed three group signature schemes based on some hard
problems in braid groups. Our schemes are the first in this direction using braid
groups. It is open to use other hard problems in braid groups for designing more
group signature schemes and other cryptographic protocols.
The first signature scheme has the property that its security is entirely depending
on the root problem. This is the only cryptographic scheme on braid groups whose
security is solely depending on the root problem. Root problem is believed to be
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harder than the conjugacy and decomposition problems. Hence we may believe that
this scheme is the most secure one. The second scheme combines the notion of
undeniable signatures with group signatures. Our third scheme is set in the usual
frame work of group signatures.
The problem of checking the equality of factors in a 3-factor decomposition of
two given braids with the middle factors known is employed in Assumption 3.1. We
leave this assumption as well as Assumption 3.2 for further investigation. The first
step in the investigation of the second assumption may be to the estimate of number
of conjugates of a random element which are equal. Numerical experiments might
throw some light on these assumptions.
The birth of braid cryptography has simulated the search for other exotic math-
ematical structures for doing public-key cryptography. People have started looking
at other nonabelian groups [25], [24], [18], [10] and combinatorial groups [22], [21]
for building public-key cryptosystems. Although, we have described our schemes
in the frame work of braid groups, these protocols can be carried over to many
other nonabelian groups with slight modifications. Further, one can modify these
protocols to other variations of group signatures like, the ring signatures and un-
deniable group signatures discussed in Section 1. Hence, we hope that this study
will motivate further research on digital signatures based on nonabelian groups and
combinatorial groups.
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